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EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ON TRIAL: 
NORIEGA, PINOCHET, AND MILOSEVIC-
TRENDS IN POliTICAL ACCOUNTABiliTY 
AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
ADAM ISAAC HASSON* 
Abstract: Prosecutions of former heads of state are becoming increas-
ingly common. In 1990, the United States arrested and convicted 
General Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian leader, on drug charges. 
United States v. Noriega set a powerful precedent, rejecting traditional 
immunity and jurisdiction defenses. In recent years, domestic and in-
ternational tribunals alike have similarly exercised jurisdiction over 
foreign leaders, such as Augosto Pinochet and Slobodan Milosevic. 
While many in the international community praise these recent de-
velopments, others warn of the erosion of national sovereignty and 
justice without limits. 
INTRODUCTION 
From the commencement of legal proceedings, United States v. 
Noriegal presented a drama of international proportions.2 Much of 
this drama was attributed to General Manuel Noriega's status as the de 
facto leader of Panama and to the unusual circumstances that brought 
him before the courts of the United States.3 Never, prior to 1990, had 
a foreign head of state been brought to the United States to stand 
trial for offenses committed outside the country.4 
On February 14, 1988, a federal grand jury sitting in Miami, Flor-
ida indicted Noriega and twelve co-conspirators on twelve counts of 
* Adam Isaac Hasson is the Editor-in-Chief of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997). 
2 Separation of Powers-Head of State Immunity-Eleventh Circuit Holds that the Executive 
Branch's Capture of Noriega Exempts Him from Head of State Immunity-United States v. Noriega, 
117 F.Jd 1206 (11th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REv. 849,849 (1998) [hereinafter Separation of 
Powers]. 
3 /d. 
4 Nathaniel Sheppard Jr. & Linda P. Campbell, Noriega Challenges U.S. Court-Lawyers 
Contest jurisdiction, Say Client is a Political Prisoner, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 5, 1990, at Cl. 
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engaging in a criminal enterprise in violation of U.S. racketeering and 
drug laws.5 The indictment alleged that Noriega participated "in an 
international conspiracy to import cocaine and materials used in pro-
ducing cocaine into and out of the [United States]."6 Furthermore, 
Noriega was alleged to have exploited his official position as com-
mander-in-chief of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) by receiv-
ing payoffs from the Colombia-based Medellin Cartel (Cartel) in ex-
change for his assistance.' Specifically, the indictment alleged that 
Noriega protected cocaine shipments from Columbia through Pan-
ama to the United States, arranged for the sale and shipment of ether 
and acetone, chemicals used for the production of cocaine, to the 
Cartel, provided a refuge and base of operations for members of the 
Cartel in Panama, and assured the safe passage of millions of dollars 
in narcotics proceeds from the United States.s All of these activities 
allegedly were undertaken for Noriega's own personal profit.9 
As a result of the indictment and the unusual circumstances of 
the case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
was presented with several issues of first impression.10 These issues 
were brought to the forefront in a series of defense motions to dis-
miss.11 In these motions, Noriega asserted that the case against him 
should have been dismissed, arguing that: ( 1) the district court lacked 
jurisdiction; (2) sovereign immunity precluded the exercise of juris-
diction; ( 3) prisoner of war status precluded jurisdiction; ( 4) he was 
captured and brought before the court as a result of an illegal military 
invasion that was "shocking to the conscience"; (5) a violation of in-
ternational treaties had occurred; and (6) the indictment against him 
was politically motivated.l2 
This Note discusses two troubling questions answered by the 
court in denying Noriega's motion to dismiss and the subsequent 
affirmation of his conviction: ( 1) How was the exercise of jurisdiction 
5 Nuriega Gives Up Leader in Panama, Leaves Embassy, Flnwn to Florida, ST. Loms PosT-
DISPATCH, Jan. 4, 1990, at 1A [hereinafter DISPATCH]. 
6 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (S.D. Fla. 1990) [hereinafter 
Nuriega 1]. 
7 John M. Goshko, Bush Confronts Dilemma Over Panama; President Must Choose Between 
Actions Likely to Fail or to Endanger U.S. Interests, WASH. PosT, May 10, 1989, atA23. The PDF 
was approximately 15,000 in strength. /d. 
8 Nuriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1510. 
9 Id. 
1° Id. at 1511. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
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rationalized?; and (2) How did the court resolve the issues of immu-
nity? 
Discussing these questions, this Note focuses on the issues of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. The legality of the 
invasion of Panama by means of Operation Just Cause, while discussed 
for background relevancy, does not represent a major issue of discus-
sion. Part I provides the historical background prior to court action, 
including the history of the military invasion. Part II discusses the 
procedural history of the Government's case against Noriega in both 
the district court and the Eleventh Circuit. Part III considers the pres-
ent state of extraterritorial jurisdiction and analyzes the court's rea-
soning in finding jurisdiction over Noriega. Part IV discusses immu-
nity of three types and their application to the Noriega case: foreign 
sovereign immunity, head of state immunity, and act of state immu-
nity. Part V analyzes the issues presented in this controversial case. 
Prior to conclusion, Part VI will compare the Noriega case to possible 
future litigation among the international community and Slobodan 
Milosevic, the former de facto leader of the former Yugoslavia, and 
Augosto Pinochet, the former leader of Chile. 
I. BACKGROUND 
From the early 1970s to 1989, General Noriega rose to progres-
sively higher positions in the Panamanian government, first as chief of 
military intelligence and later as commander-in-chief of the PDF.l3 As 
a result of his position, Noriega came into contact with members of 
the Colombia-based Medellin Cartel in the early 1980s.14 Thereafter, 
Cartel operatives and Noriega met and arranged for the shipment of 
cocaine through Panama into the United States.l5 In addition to the 
shipments of cocaine, the parties arranged for the transportation of 
chemicals necessary for narcotic manufacturing and substantial cash 
proceeds from drug sales in the United States.16 This relationship 
proved financially rewarding for Noriega, who amassed a personal 
13 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1210 (lith Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Noriega 
11]. Noriega also had a long tenure as a Central Intelligence Agency informer prior to the 
indictment. See DISPATCH, supra note 5. The United States later publicly acknowledged that 
the CIA and the U.S. Army had paid Noriega approximately $320,000 over his career. 
Larry Rohter, More Than an Ex-Dictator's Future at Stake as Trial of Noriega Begins, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 1991, at D24 [hereinafter Rohter I]. 
14 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1211. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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fortune of approximately twenty million U.S. dollars located in Euro-
pean banks.l7 
Following Noriega's indictment in February 1988, then Panama-
nian President Eric Arturo Delvalle discharged Noriega from his post 
as commander of the PDF.18 However, Noriega refused to step down, 
and Delvalle was subsequently removed from power.19 Following these 
events, Noriega successfully frustrated a March, 1988 coup attempt to 
remove him from power. 20 
While these events transpired, American President George Bush 
pondered steps to remove Noriega from power.21 While members of 
Congress called for tough measures, Bush feared that any action 
would likely be ineffective or pose significant risks to U.S. interests in 
Latin America; anything resembling an invasion could have resulted 
in sabotage to the Panama Canal.22 Furthermore, Bush had limited 
time in which to decide since the administration of the Canal was due 
to be transferred to an ethnic Panamanian administrator in 1990, and 
the Senate would likely disapprove of any candidate nominated by 
Noriega.23 More direct solutions came under consideration, however, 
when the indictment, American threats, sanctions, and negotiations 
failed to persuade Noriega to step down, but rather aggravated the 
economic ruin that had befallen Panama. 24 
On December 15, 1989, the Panamanian National Assembly, led 
by a machete-wielding Noriega, publicly declared that a state of war 
existed between the Republic of Panama and the United States.25 Fol-
lowing this declaration, on December 16, 1989, numerous attacks on 
Americans occurred in Panama, including the murder of U.S. Marine 
Corps. Lieutenant Roberto Paz and the beating of U.S. Navy Lieuten-
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1209. 
19 Noriega II, 117 F.3d at 1209-10. The United States continued to recognize Delvalle as 
the leader of Panama until the election of Guillermo the following year. Id. at 1210. 
2° Rohter I, supra note 13. 
21 Goshko, supra note 7. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See generally id. (citing that American sanctions had not had any effect upon Noriega, 
who was independently wealthy as a result of his dealings with the Medellin Cartel). 
25 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1511; Communication from the President of the United 
States Transmitting a Report on the Development Concerning the Deployment of United 
States Forces to Panama on December 20, 1989, H.R. Doc. No. 101-127 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter President's Letter]. 
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antAdamJohn Curtis by the PDF.26 On the morning of December 20, 
1989, the democratically elected leadership of Panama, led by Gui-
llermo Endara,27 announced the formation of a government, assumed 
power, and welcomed U.S. assistance to remove Noriega.28 Immedi-
ately recognizing Endara as the legitimate head of the Panamanian 
state,29 Bush ordered the deployment of 11,000 additional forces to 
join the 13,000 already present in Panama on December 20, 1989, as 
Operation just Cause, with a defined mission to: (I) protect American 
lives; (2) defend democracy; (3) ensure the integrity of the Panama 
Canal Treaties; and (4) apprehend Noriega and bring him to trial on 
the drug related charges for which he was indicted in 1988.30 
Hoping to be granted political asylum,31 Noriega took refuge in 
the Vatican Embassy on December 24, 1990,32 moments before a U.S. 
Special Forces unit arrived at his residence to seize him.33 Vatican 
officials refused to surrender Noriega, and he refused to leave on his 
own accord.34 Once the U.S. Army located Noriega at the Embassy, 
units launched a form of psychological attack by playing loud rock 
music.35 
Finally, Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990,36 after the Vati-
can threatened to lift its diplomatic immunity and invite Panamanian 
security forces to arrest him if he did not leave voluntarily.37 Accom-
panied by papal nuncio Monsignor Sebastian Laboa, Noriega surren-
dered to the U.S. Army and was taken by helicopter to nearby Howard 
Air Base, and from there by C-130 to Homestead Air Force base in 
Florida.38 Following the surrender, thousands of Panamanians cele-
brated in the streets,39 with President Endara expressing relief to be 
26 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 CoLUM. J. 
ThANSNAT'LL. 281,285 (1991). 
27 Noriega/, 746 F. Supp. at 1511. Endara had won the Panamanian presidential elec-
tion held several months earlier, the results of which were nullified by Noriega. /d. 
28 President's Letter, supra note 25. 
29 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1511. 
30 President's Letter, supra note 25. 
31 Noriega/, 746 F. Supp. at 1511. 
32 Noriega Gives Up to U.S. Military, TORONTO STAR, jan. 4, 1990, at AI [hereinafter To-
RONTO]. 
33 Sheppard & Campbell, supra note 4. 
34 ToRONTO, supra note 32. 
35 /d. The playing of music was discontinued after Embassy staff complained of har-
assment. /d. 
36 See id. 
37 Sheppard & Campbell, supra note 4. 
38 TORONTO, supra note 32. 
39 /d. 
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"rid of this criminal."40 Following the invasion, where 25 U.S. service-
men,41 300 PDF members,42 and 300 Panamanians were killed,43 
President Bush promised that Noriega would receive a fair trial,44 in 
what proved to be yet another battle between the United States and 
Noriega. 
A. Justification for Just Cause 
Following Noriega's capture, debate ensued over the legality of 
American actions in Panama.45 President Bush argued that the events 
leading up to the invasion made it clear that not only were the lives 
and welfare of American citizens at risk, but that the continued safe 
operation of the Panama Canal was in jeopardy.46 Thus, with narrowly 
defined objectives,47 Bush argued that the invasion was justified as an 
exercise of self-defense pursuant to United Nations (U.N.) Charter 
Article 51,48 directly attributing the hostile acts against American serv-
icemen to Noriega's dictatorship.49 Moreover, Bush asserted that 
Noriega's arrest would send "a clear signal that the U.S. [was] serious 
in its determination that those charged with promoting the distribu-
tion of drugs cannot escape the scrutiny of justice. "50 
The debate concerning the legality of Operation Just Cause cen-
tered upon the interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. 
Charter.51 Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that "[a]ll Members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state .... "52 However, scholars argued that the Charter, through Arti-
40 DISPATCH, supra note 5. 
41 Rohter I, supra note 13. 
42 TORONTO, supra note 32. 
43 DISPATCH, supra note 5. 
44 TORONTO, supra note 32. 
45 See generally Sofaer, supra note 26. 
46 President's Letter, supra note 25. 
47 President's Letter, supra note 25. Bush stated several objectives, including: (1) pro-
tection of American lives; (2) defense of democracy in Panama; (3) ensuring the integrity 
of the Panama Canal Treaties; and ( 4) the apprehension of General Noriega to bring him 
to trial on drug related charges in the United States. Id. 
48 Id. Article 51 provides that, "[n]othing ... shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 1. 
49 President's Letter, supra note 25. 
50 DISPATCH, supra note 5. 
51 See Sofaer, supra note 26, at 282. 
52 U.N. CHARTER art. 2 ( 4) , para. 1. 
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de 51, preserves the right of self-defense as inherent, and that states 
commonly used force to defend not only their territory but also their 
nationals and property.53 Thus, it was argued, the acts of aggression 
against Lieutenants Paz and Curtis, in addition to numerous other 
acts of hostility, 54 justified the use of American self-defense to defend 
U.S. nationals. 55 Furthermore, as a result of Noriega's repudiation of 
the United States' rights under the Panama Canal Treaties56 and their 
support of President Endara,57 the United States was authorized to 
take action, pursuant to these 1977 Treaties, for the purpose of pro-
tecting its troops stationed in Panama and for defending and operat-
ing the Canal_58 
However, critics of the American invasion made themselves heard 
in an equally assertive voice.59 Opponents claimed that the state of 
tension existing at the end of 1989 did not present an imminent dan-
ger to the United States, and therefore, the invasion was not a neces-
sity.GO Furthermore, the invasion was not a proportionate response to 
the incidents ofthe time, the most serious of which was the murder of 
Lieutenant Paz.6I While these incidents were tragic, critics argued, 
they did not warrant the launching of a full-scale attack the likes of 
which had not been seen since the Vietnam War.62 In addition, it was 
53 Sofaer, supra note 26, at 281. See generally T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humani-
tarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 32 
(2001). 
54 Sofaer, supra note 26, at 284 n.12. The following classified violations occurred be-
tween 1988-1989: (1) a U.S. Army sergeant, detained for allegedly fighting with a Pana-
manian citizen, was reported to have been beaten with a rubber hose; (2) a U.S. Army 
sergeant allegedly was attacked and forced into a car trunk by a Panamanian dressed in 
military uniform, who then proceeded to rape the sergeant's wife; (3) PDF members al-
legedly fired shots through the window of a home occupied by a U.S. Army officer; (4) a 
member of the U.S. Navy was detained by the PDF for a parking violation and allegedly 
beaten after refusing to relinquish his watch and ring; and (5) a PDF member fired a shot 
into a vehicle carrying the children of U.S. Defense Department employees. !d. 
55 See id. at 285. 
56 !d. at 290. It is claimed that Noriega repudiated American rights in the Canal when 
he publicly declared, on December 20, 1989, "only one territory and only one flag." !d.; see 
also Panama Canal Treaties, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Pan., 33 U.S.T. 1-491. 
57 Sofaer, supra note 26, at 290. 
58 !d. at 287. 
59 See generally Ved P. Nanda, Agora: U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human 
Rights Activists?, 84 AM.J. INT'L. L. 494,494 (1990). 
60 !d. at 497. 
61 See id. 
62 !d. 
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argued that the restoration of democracy in Panama was not a prac-
tice supported by even the most expansive reading of Article 51.63 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
Noriega was indicted by a federal grand jury sitting in Miami in 
February, 198864 and charged with: (1) engaging in a pattern of rack-
eteering activity in violation ofthe RICO statutes, 18 U.S.C §§ 1962(c) 
and (d); (2) conspiracy to distribute and import cocaine into the 
United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C § 963; (3) distributing and aid-
ing and abetting the distribution of cocaine, intending that it be im-
ported into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C § 959 and 18 
U.S.C § 2; (4) aiding and abetting the manufacture of cocaine des-
tined for the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C § 959 and 18 
U.S.C § 2; (5) conspiring to manufacture cocaine intending that it be 
imported into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C § 963; and 
(6) causing interstate travel and use of facilities in interstate com-
merce to promote an unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C 
§ 1952(a) (3) and 18 U.S.C § 2.65 
Subsequent to the indictment and prior to Noriega's arrest, in 
April, 1988, Judge Hoeveler of the Southern District of Florida 
granted Noriega's motion to allow for special appearance of coun-
sel.66 The court held that Noriega had the right to challenge the valid-
ity of the indictment without surrendering himself, and agreed to 
hear the motion even though courts had not allowed fugitive defen-
dants to make special appearance of counsel in the past.67 This special 
request was granted because the defense motion was claimed to go to 
the heart of the government's case and the court's jurisdiction, and 
because of the extraordinary circumstances of the case.68 Moreover, 
Judge Hoeveler encouraged the government to welcome the appear-
ance of special counsel or any procedure that would negate the per-
ception that Noriega's prosecution was politically motivated.69 
In February, 1988, the defense brought a motion to dismiss the 
jurisdiction of the court even though Noriega maintained control of 
63 !d. at 498. 
64 DISPATCH, supra note 5. 
65 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1510. 
66 Id. 
67 STEVE ALBERT, THE CASE AGAINST THE GENERAL 13 7 ( 1993). 
68 ld. at 137-38. 
69 Id. at 138. 
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Panama. 70 Although the defense conceded that American courts had 
generally upheld exercises of jurisdiction over acts in other countries 
intended to have effects in the United States, the defense asserted 
that jurisdiction did not apply in the case against Noriega because he 
was the leader of a sovereign nation.71 In its motion, the defense ar-
gued that even though Noriega was not a democratically elected 
leader, his position as the acknowledged de facto leader of Panama 
qualified him for immunity since there was no bright line to deter-
mine who was entitled to immunity.72 Moreover, the defense con-
tended that the exercise of jurisdiction was unreasonable in light of 
the interests of other nations,73 and that the indictment was based on 
impermissible political and foreign policy considerations. 74 
The Government responded, however, that many of the acts 
claimed in the indictment were alleged to have occurred within U.S 
territory.75 Furthermore, the prosecution contested Noriega's claim of 
immunity because Panama had not requested this status for Noriega, 
and many of his acts were undertaken allegedly for his own personal 
gain.76 
Judge Hoeveler was of the opinion that the Government's case 
was not without merit. 77 Hoeveler, in his June 8th omnibus order dis-
missing Noriega's preliminary motion, stated that the jurisdictional 
question was entirely separate from whether Noriega was immune 
from prosecution as head of state.78 Thus, the court held that jurisdic-
tion could be found, as extraterritorial jurisdiction was upheld in the 
past over foreigners who conspired or intended to import narcotics 
into the United States.79 Jurisdiction was reasonable in light of the 
70 ld. 
71 ld. 
72ALBERT, supra note 67, at 139. 
75 See id. at 138. The defense argued that Noriega's acts had no direct physical conse-
quences in the United States, and in the alternative, the effects were at best ambiguous. ld. 
at 139. Furthermore, the defense reiterated the fears of the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market, who were wary that without a limit to American jurisdiction in this case 
there would be virtually no limit to a nation's exercise of jurisdiction in the future. ld. 
74 Id. at 141. 
75 Id. The prosecution pointed out that Noriega was alleged to have arranged for the 
shipment of 2141 pounds of cocaine to be transported from Panama into Miami in june, 
1984, and that Noriega had arranged for the purchase of a business class jet in Miami that 
would be used to fly proceeds of cash sales and drugs between Miami and Panama. ld. 
76 See id. 
77 ALBERT, supra note 67, at 141. 
7s Nrniega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1512. 
79 ALBERT, supra note 67, at 141. 
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activity in question and the importance of regulating that activity.80 
Given the serious nature of the drug epidemic, jurisdiction was not 
unreasonable, as the defense had claimed.81 Furthermore, the court 
opined that Noriega was not entitled to immunity because he was 
never recognized as the legitimate political leader of Panama; to allow 
immunity regardless of a leader's source of power would allow ille-
gitimate dictators the benefit of protection from their seizure of 
power.82 This Note focuses on this motion and the issues of immunity 
and extraterritorial jurisdiction. 83 
With the preliminary motion dismissed, and Noriega's subse-
quent surrender and capture, Noriega was formally arraigned in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in January, 
1990.84 Mter entering an innocent plea,85 trial was set to begin in Sep-
tember, 1991.86 Months later, on April9, 1992, Noriega was convicted 
on eight of ten counts by a jury of nine women and three men after 
five days of deliberations87 and sentenced to a total of forty years. 88 
Subsequently, the district court denied Noriega's motion for a new 
trial,89 and his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.90 
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL jURISDICTION & THE GENERAL 
In the preliminary motion to dismiss, the defense stated five rea-
sons why the District Court should divest itself of jurisdiction.91 One of 
the major issues the court needed to resolve was that of extraterrito-
rialjurisdiction.92 As stated, this issue was considered entirely separate 
from the issue of immunity,93 which is discussed in Part IV below. 
so Seeid. at 142. 
81 See id. 
82 Id. 
83 A brief overview of the motion is provided here to give the reader a broad frame-
work of the action. 
84 See Sheppard & Campbell, supra note 4. 
85 ld. 
86 Larry Rohter, The Nariega Verdict; U.S. jury Convicts Nariega of Drug-Trafficking Role as 
the Leader of Panama, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1992, at A1 [hereinafter Rohter II]. 
87 Id. 
88 Nariega II, 117 F. 3d at 1210. 
89 ld. at 1222. 
90 Id. 
91 Nariega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1511-12. The bases for the motion to dismiss were: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction; (2) claim of immunity; (3) prisoner of war status; (4) illegal military action; 
and (5) violation of due process. ld. 
92 ld. at 1509. 
93 ld. at 1512. 
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Jurisdiction is commonly used to describe the court's authority to 
affect legal interests.94 There are three categories ofjurisdiction:95 (1) 
jurisdiction to prescribe is the ability of a state to make its laws appli-
cable to activities, relations, and status of persons or a person's inter-
ests in property;96 (2) jurisdiction to adjudicate is the authority of a 
state to subject particular persons or things to its judicial processes;97 
and (3) jurisdiction to enforce is the authority of a state to use its re-
sources to induce or compel compliance with its laws.98 The issue con-
fronting the Noriega court concerned jurisdiction to prescribe.99 
International law has given principal attention to a state's juris-
diction to prescribe law in criminal matters.100 There are numerous 
theories of jurisdiction to prescribe.101 The territorial theory allows 
for jurisdiction over persons, things, or acts that takes place within the 
territorial boundaries of the state.102 Under the nationality theory, a 
state may prescribe law over persons or things that share its national-
ity.I03 Moreover, customary international law, under the nationality 
theory, permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over its subjects wher-
ever they may be located.104 The protective principle expands these 
traditional bases of jurisdiction by emphasizing the effect of an of-
fense committed outside the territory of a state and allows the exer-
cise of jurisdiction where conduct is deemed harmful to the national 
interests of the forum state.105 Most European countries have ac-
cepted this approach, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Spain, Sweden, and Greece.l06 Thus, any state may impose liability, 
94 LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw 1046 (3d ed. 1993). 
95 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 401 (1987). 
96 Id. § 401 (a). 
97 HENKIN, supra note 94, at 1046. 
98 Id. 
99 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1512. 
1oo HENKIN, supra note 94, at 1047. 
1o1 See generally id. at 1049. 
102 Christopher L. Blakesley, United States jurisdiction Over Extraterritmial Crime, 73 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1110 (1982). 
103 HENKIN, supra note 94, at 1049. 
104 Blackmerv. United States, 284 U.S. 421,438 n.2 (1932). 
105 Blakesley, supra note 102, at 1111. 
106 REsTATEMENT, supra note 95, § 403 reporter's note 3. All nations of the world rec-
ognize that a person who intends to put into motion that which has effects in another state 
is answerable to the state where the evil is done. Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1513 (citing Ri-
vard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 887 (5th Cir. 1967)). The protective principle recog-
nizes the right of a state to punish offenses committed outside the territory by non-
nationals that are directed against the security of the state, or other offenses threatening 
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even among persons who are not its nationals, for conduct outside its 
borders that has effects and consequences within its borders that the 
state reprehends.1°7 For example, the United States would have juris-
diction over an individual who, standing in Canada, shoots and kills 
an American in the United States.IOS Even more liberal, the passive 
personality principle of jurisdiction extends jurisdiction over offenses 
where the victims are nationals of the forum state.109 Lastly, the uni-
versal principle, the most controversial basis, allows for jurisdiction in 
any forum that obtains physical jurisdiction over the person of the 
perpetrator of certain offenses considered particularly heinous or 
harmful to humankind, such as genocide, war crimes, slavery, piracy, 
and the like.110 Although relatively new, jurisdiction by the passive 
personality and universal principles is not precluded by norms of cus-
tomary international law,m and generally, a state may utilize these 
bases so long as it is not prohibited by internationallaw.ll2 
However, a state is not without limits in its exercise of jurisdic-
tion.113 International law provides that a state may not exercise juris-
diction to prescribe when doing so would be unreasonable.114 
Whether jurisdiction is unreasonable is determined by weighing a 
non-exhaustive list of factors, including the link of the activity to the 
regulating state, the foreseeable effects in that state, the character of 
the activity to be regulated, and the extent to which the regulation is 
consistent with the patterns and practice of the international sys-
tem.115 Although the proper limits of jurisdiction over transnational 
the integrity of the governmental functions that are generally recognized as crimes by 
developed legal systems. REsTATEMENT, supra note 95, § 402 cmt. f. 
107 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. et al., 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
1os Nariega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1513. 
109 Blakesley, supra note 102, at 1111. The United States has recognized the passive 
personality principle at least where the state has a particularly strong interest in the crime. 
United States v. Fawaz funis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. 1991). 
no Blakesley, supra note 102, at 1111. In February, 2001, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, finding three Bosnian Serbs guilty of the rape and 
torture of women during the Bosnian War, for the first time ruled that rape was a crime 
against humanity, opening a whole new category of war crime that may be amenable under 
a more liberal basis of jurisdiction such as the universal principle. See Peter Finn, Watershed 
Ruling on Rape; Serbs Found Guilty of "Crime Against Humanity," WASH. PosT, Feb. 23, 2001, at 
AOl. 
Ill SeeFawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091. 
112 See Case of the S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 21. 
113 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 95, § 403. 
114 /d.§ 403(1). 
115 /d. § 403 (2). 
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activity have been questioned,ll6 extraterritorial prosecutions com-
monly have included serious offenses, such as the traffic of narcot-
ics.n7 
Even among U.S. courts, there is little consensus on how far ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction should extend.l18 However, all courts recog-
nize that at some point the interests of the United States are too weak 
and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify 
an extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.119 At least one court has 
adopted a "direct or substantial effect test," relevant in the case 
against Noriega, which holds that jurisdiction should be supported in 
any case where the effects are more than insubstantial and indirect.I20 
With these background principles in mind, the district court ad-
dressed the issue "whether the [United States] may exercise jurisdic-
tion over Noriega's alleged criminal activities."12I Noriega's challenge 
to the court's jurisdiction was that such an exercise was unreasonable 
under any standard of international law since he did not personally 
perform any illegal acts within the United States.122 In deciding this 
issue, the court refrained from looking at Noriega's official status, in-
stead focusing entirely upon the conduct at issue as alleged in the in-
dictment.123 
In addition to possessing the power to reach the conduct in ques-
tion under customary international law, a court seeking to exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction also must determine whether the crimes 
under which the defendant is charged are intended to have extrater-
ritorial effect.I24 The court held that all of the crimes under which 
Noriega was charged were so intended, since the drug statutes appli-
cable were designed to stop the importation and distribution of nar-
cotics.I25 Moreover, the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C § 1962(c), (d), as well 
116 See id., reporter's note 1; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
813-14 (1993) (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
117 See REsTATEMENT, supra note 95, § 403 reporter's note 8. 
118 Timberlane Lumber Co. et al. v. Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust & Savings Ass'n, 549 F.2d 
597, 610 (9th Cir. 1976). 
119 /d. at 609. 
120 See id. at 611. 




125 See id. at 1515-19 (providing that a statute is given extraterritorial effect where 
Congress intends so; in the absence of such intent, courts may infer the power to exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the statute). 
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as the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C § 1952(a) (3), express a clear congressional 
intent to apply extraterritorially_126 
More importantly, however, a court must rationalize the exercise 
of jurisdiction with the custom and practice of internationallaw.127 In 
the United States, jurisdiction may be exercised over a foreign defen-
dant who merely conspires or intends to import narcotics into the na-
tion's territory.t2s This "intent" doctrine has resulted in the exercise of 
jurisdiction over persons who had intended, but failed, to import nar-
cotics into the United States, because the purpose of narcotics law is 
to prevent smugglers from succeeding in introducing their illegal 
shipmen ts.129 
On a more traditional level, the court held that several principles 
of customary international law supported jurisdiction over Noriega.130 
First, the indictment charged Noriega with several acts that occurred 
within the territory of the United States, such as the purchase of a 
Lear jet in Miami that was subsequently used to transport cocaine and 
proceeds to and from Panama.m These facts would support the exer-
cise of the most traditional basis of jurisdiction, the territorial princi-
ple, which allows for the exercise of jurisdiction over acts occurring 
within a state's territory.m Secondly, the court found that jurisdiction 
was justified under the protective principle,133 which permits the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over acts that threaten the existence of the state 
and have potentially deleterious effects in that state.134 It was evident, 
in Hoeveler's opinion, that the acts allegedly attributed to Noriega 
would have certain and harmful effects in the United States, as are-
sult of the alleged importation of 2141 pounds of cocaine into Mi-
ami.135 
126 Nariega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1515-19. 
127 See id. at 1512. 
128 Id. at 1513 (citing United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 862 (5th Cir. 1929)). 
129 Id. at 1513 (citing United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
International law does not prohibit jurisdiction in such circumstances subject to the prin-
ciple of reasonableness. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 95, § 403(1 ). Such action in the ab-
sence of international prohibition is not illegal. See generally S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 
P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 21. 
130 See Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1513. 
131 Id. at 1513-14. 
132 HENKIN, supra note 94, at 1049. 
133 See generally Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1514. 
134 See HENKIN, supra note 94, at 1049. 
135 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1514. 
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IV. THE IMMUNITY QUESTION 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the international law of state 
immunity was broader than today.I36 In general, under an absolute 
theory of immunity, a state and its property were entitled to immunity 
from the judicial process of another state.U17 Around 1900, however, a 
new concept of sovereign immunity emerged.138 Throughout the 
twentieth century, the immunity of a state and its leaders narrowed 
under the widely accepted restrictive theory of immunity.I39 Under 
this restrictive theory, a distinction is made between public and pri-
vate acts, with a state entitled to immunity for the prior, but not the 
latter.140 In developing this new theory, the formulating courts rea-
soned that immunity was intended to apply only to acts involving state 
sovereignty.l41 They described those acts as public acts, political acts, 
or acts done jure imperii.142 Such acts were distinguished from private 
acts or acts jure gestionis, such as commercial acts, where immunity was 
not intended to extend.l43 
As with states, public officials are entitled to immunity for acts 
executed in their official capacities.144 However, consistent with the 
restrictive theory of immunity, public officials are amenable to suit for 
acts in their private capacities or for those undertaken for their own 
personal gain.145 The test as to whether a public official is personally 




1 ~9 See id. 
140 Id. 
141 SwEENEY, supra note 136, at ii. 
142 Id. 
1~ Id. In Societe Anonyme des Chemins de Fer Liegeois Luxembourgeois v. The Netherlands, de-
cided june 11, 1903, the Supreme Court of Belgium stated the difference between public 
and private acts as follows: 
Sovereignty is involved only when political acts are accomplished by the state . 
. . . However, the state is not bound to confine itself to a political role, and 
can ... buy, own, contract, become creditor or debtor, [become criminally li-
able], and engage in commerce .... In the discharge of these functions, the 
state is not acting as public power, but does what private persons do, and as 
such, is acting in a civil and private capacity. 
Id. at ii-iii. 
144 Id. at vii. 
145 Seeid. 
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liable in litigation is whether the act of the official is sufficiently con-
nected with the state as to make it an action by the state.146 
The restrictive theory of immunity has gained wide acceptance 
since its inception.I47 Long applied by states such as Austria, Belgium, 
Egypt, France, Italy, and Switzerland,l48 nearly all non-communist 
states now accept the restrictive theory.149 The shift to restrictive ap-
plication can be found elsewhere.150 In Great Britain, for example, the 
State Immunity Act of 1978 conformed British law to that of most 
other developed countries.151 The Council of Europe also has made 
use of the restrictive theory through the promulgation of the Conven-
tion on State Immunity and Additional Protocoi.I52 
The United States has also accepted the restrictive theory.153 Ini-
tially, U.S. courts adhered to the absolute theory of sovereign immu-
nity under which a foreign state enjoyed immunity from all suits in 
federal courts.154 During the nineteenth century, U.S. courts relied 
upon suggestions from the State Department when deciding whether 
to extend immunity, thereby resisting the growing international prac-
tice of restrictive applications.I55 However, in 1952, the United States 
formally adopted the restrictive theory of immunity after the publica-
tion of the Tate Letter, which advised U.S. courts not to grant immu-
nity over non-governmental activities of states.156 Thus, from 1952 un-
til 1977, a foreign state made party to litigation in the federal courts 
was required to request a claim of sovereign immunity through the 
State Department.157 If the claim was recognized, the State Depart-
ment would communicate its decision to the appropriate court.J58 
However, this structure proved awkward,159 since it resulted in a prac-
146 Sweeney, supra note 136, at 7. 
147 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 95, § 451 cmt. a. 
14ll Id., reporter's note 1. 
149 Id., cmt. a. 
150 Michael P. Davis, Accountability and World Leadership: Impugning Sovereign Immunity, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1357, 1367. 
151 !d. 
152 /d. at 1368. 
153 See generally Chuidian v. Philippines Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990). 
154 Id. 
155 jOHN R. STEVENSON ET AL., UNITED STATES LAw OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY RELAT-
ING TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 13 (1983). 
156 See id. at 13-14. 
157 /d. at 15. 
158 /d. at 14. 
159 Id. at 15. 
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tice whereby the State Department, rather than the courts, deter-
mined whether to dismiss a suit based on a claim ofimmunity.160 
To remedy these conflicts, Congress enacted the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976161 (FSIA) in October, 1976.162 The FSIA 
codified the law of sovereign immunity and removed the State De-
partment's role in immunity determinations.163 Henceforth, the FSIA 
and the presiding judge's interpretation thereof became the basis for 
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state entity in the U.S. courts.164 
The FSIA sets forth the general rule that a foreign state shall be 
entitled to immunity except as otherwise provided.165 In general, an 
exception is permitted, and thus immunity inapplicable, where a for-
eign state has waived immunity (pursuant to contract or appearance), 
or where the action is based on commercial activity.166 
However, the FSIA does not mention head of state immunity nor 
foreign sovereign immunity in the criminal context, both of which 
were vital to the exercise of jurisdiction over Noriega.l67 Thus, as the 
Eleventh Circuit illustrated in rejecting Noriega's appeal, the court 
must look to the Executive Branch for guidance when considering 
claims of immunity by a head of state or where criminal matters are 
being prosecuted.168 
In its preliminary motion to dismiss, the defense asserted several 
theories of immunity, including head of state immunity, diplomatic 
immunity, and the act of state doctrine.169 As with the other argu-
ments presented by the defense, the court found these arguments 
fruitless.170 With the FSIA inapplicable to these issues, the court was 
compelled to look to the patterns and practices of customary interna-
tionallaw.171 
160 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1110. 
161 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1605 (1994 & Supp. 2000). 
162 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1110; see also STEVENSON ET AL., supra note 155, at 17. The 
FSIA became effective january 19, 1977. Id. 
163 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1110. 
164 Id. 
165 STEVENSON, supra note 155, at 18 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604). 
166 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (1),(2). 
167 Noriega II, 117 F.3d at 1212; see Ved P. Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign Immunities 
(Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity)--Some 
Reflections, 5 ILSAJ. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 467,470 (1999). 
168 Nrniega II, 117 F.3d at 1212. 
169 See Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1519. 
17o SeegeneraUy id. at 1519-25. 
171 See generaUy Nanda, supra note 167, at 470. 
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A. Head of State Immunity 
Customary international law has long held that a head of state is 
not subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts in actions relating to 
official acts.l72 The rationale behind such custom is to promote inter-
national equality, respect among nations, and freedom of action by 
heads of state without fear of repercussions.173 However, as the Noriega 
court illustrated, criminal activities such as the trafficking of narcotics 
could not be considered an official act.174 
In order to benefit from head of state immunity, a government 
official must be recognized by the immunizing state as the head of 
state.175 However, recognition is considered a discretionary function, 
with there generally being no legal duty to recognize the validity of a 
state or its leader.176 In Noriega's case, it was evident that the General 
was merely the commander of the PDF, and was never recognized by 
the Panamanian Constitution or the United States as Panama's head 
of state.177 Panama had not even sought immunity on behalf of 
Noriega through the State Department.17S Even if recognized as the de 
facto leader of Panama, the court opined, the grant of immunity is a 
privilege that may be freely withheld by the United States.179 
Thus, because the FSIA did not control head of state immunity 
determinations, the court looked to the Executive Branch for guid-
ance.180 By pursuing Noriega's capture and prosecution, the court 
reasoned, the Executive Branch had affirmatively manifested its intent 
to deny any form of immunity for Noriega.181 Unlike Lafontat v. Aris-
tide, 182 which resulted in the dismissal of a civil case against the Presi-
dent of Haiti due to the State Department's suggestion of applying 
head of state immunity to the defendant's status, there was no such 
suggestion in the case against Noriega.ls3 
172 Nariega L 746 F. Supp. at 1519 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 




176 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 92 (4th ed. 1990). 
177 Nariega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1519. 
178 Nariega II, ll7 F.3d at 1212. 
179 Nariega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1520 (citing Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 116 (1812)). 
180 Nariega II, 117 F.3d at 1212. 
181 Id. 
182 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y 1994). 
183 Nanda, supra note 167, at 476. Cases such as these are more common than one 
might expect. For example, in the winter of 2001, two such cases made headlines in the 
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B. Act of State Doctrine 
Another basis of Noriega's immunity claim was that his actions 
were precluded under the act of state doctrine.184 The act of state doc-
trine provides that a court will generally refrain from examining the 
validity of the acts of another state within its territory.185 This princi-
ple also extends to governmental acts of state officials vested with sov-
ereign authority.186 However, Noriega could not benefit from this 
form of protection because he was unable to establish that his alleged 
actions were taken on behalf of Panama.I87 The court rejected the act 
of state defense,188 unable to see how Noriega's alleged drug 
trafficking could conceivably constitute a public action for the benefit 
of Panama.I89 Rather, in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, Noriega's al-
leged acts, if true, were for his own personal enrichment.190 
1. Extradition 
In his defense, Noriega also asserted that the District Court 
should have divested itself of jurisdiction because narcotics trafficking 
international press. In a French case, a French prosecutor urged France's highest court to 
protect Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi from prosecution for the 1989 bombing of a 
French DC-10 airliner over Niger in which 170 people died, fearing that such a prosecu-
tion would open a ''Pandora's box" of possible suits against France. Reuters, French Prosecu-
tor Urges Immunity for Gaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, availabk at http://www. 
nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-france.htm. In another case, the Bush Admini-
stration moved to grant President Mugabe of Zimbabwe immunity from a civil suit accus-
ing him of torture, ordering murders, and terrorism, citing the principle of reciprocity. 
Jim Wolf, U.S. Seeks to Shield Mugrzbefrom Suit, BosTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2001, at A6. Addi-
tionally, a Belgian court also sought to test the limits of universal jurisdiction, attempting 
to indict Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for allegedly allowing the massacre of Pales-
tinians during the Lebanon invasion. Victors'justice, NEWSDAY,July 8, 2001, at B1-B2. 
184 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1521. 
185 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 95, § 443(1); see also Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 
250, 250 (1897). 
186 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1521. 
18' Id. (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 694 
(1976)). 
188 !d. at 1523. 
The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does 
not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of 
foreign acts of state .... [The doctrine's] 'constitutional' underpinnings ... 
[arise] out of the basic relationship between branches of government in a sys-
tem of separation of powers. 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,423 (1964). 
189 Id. at 1522. 
190 Noriega II, 117 F.3d at 1212. 
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was not one of the crimes listed in the operating extradition treaty 
between the United States and Panama.191 However, in addition to 
being contemplated by subsequent treaties between the United States 
and Panama, crimes of narcotics trafficking are recognized as extra-
ditable offenses under internationallaw.192 
Nevertheless, it is obvious to even the casual observer that the 
means by which Noriega came before the court was not by traditional 
extradition,l93 In the United States, however, the manner by which a 
defendant is brought before the court normally does not affect the 
ability of the government to try him.l94 This tenet of law, known as the 
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, holds that a court is not deprived of jurisdiction 
over a forcibly abducted defendant. 195 In Ker, the defendant was forci-
bly kidnapped in Peru and brought to the United States.196 There, the 
Court refused to divest itself of jurisdiction, holding that it was idle to 
claim that a fugitive from justice had the right to remain in another 
country.197 
In addition, the Noriega Court held that a known exception, the 
Toscanino exception, was inapplicable.198 In United States v. Toscanino,199 
the court held that due process required that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine 
must yield and the court must divest itself of jurisdiction where a de-
fendant is brought before the court as the result of the government's 
deliberate and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional 
rights.2oo There, a criminal defendant was interrogated for several 
days by Justice Department agents and thereafter abducted from 
Uruguay.2°1 However, the Noriega Court distinguished Toscanino, hold-
ing that there were neither allegations of mistreatment of Noriega nor 
conduct so egregious that it shocked the conscience; therefore, the 
exception did not apply.202 
191 Noriega/, 746 F. Supp. at 1528. 
192 /d. 
193 See id. at 1529. 
194 Jd. 
195 SeeKerv. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436,444 (1886). 
196 Id. at 438. 
197 Id. at 442. 
198 See Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1532. 
199 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). 
200 Id. at 275. 
201 /d. at 270. The defendant was forced to walk up and down a hallway for several 
hours at a time, had alcohol flushed into his eyes, his fingers pinched with pliers, and was 
severely beaten. Id. 
2o2 Noriega I, 746 F. Supp. at 1531 n.27. 
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Despite these holdings, Noriega asserted on appeal that such a 
forcible abduction in the presence of an extradition treaty was uncon-
scionable.203 Nonetheless, the court quickly disposed of this argu-
ment, holding that the presence of an extradition treaty that did not 
prohibit abductions was nearly irrelevant on the matter.204 The court, 
relying on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 205 held that a federal court 
might acquire jurisdiction over a criminal defendant abducted from a 
foreign country notwithstanding the existence of an extradition 
treaty.206 
V. jUSTIFICATIONS & SHORTCOMINGS 
The Noriega Court has been criticized for its failure to clarify the 
role of the judi_cial branch in determining head of state immunity.207 
In essence, the court effectively increased judicial discretion on this 
issue through its determination of executive intention.2°8 In doing so, 
the court has provided the country, indeed the world, with a guiding 
opinion that may be used in future head of state immunity determina-
tions involving Augosto Pinochet of Chile and Slobodan Milosevic of 
the former 'fugoslavia. 209 Critics argue that the court should have fol-
lowed a "default-no-immunity rule," which sets forth that, absent Ex-
ecutive Branch guidance, a court should not grant immunity, and 
should refuse to weigh the issue itself. 210 Although the same result of 
no immunity for Noriega would have occurred, the approach taken by 
the Noriega Court in carving out a role for itself to determine execu-
tive intention will undercut the political and foreign affairs role of the 
Executive Branch and may increase the likelihood of inconsistent de-
terminations. 211 In refusing to acknowledge head of state immunity 
for Noriega, the court created a new category of executive suggestion 
in cases where the Executive Branch remains silent-non-verbal mani-
festation of executive intent.212 The legal problem, however, was that 
20s See Noriega II, 117 F.3d at 1212-14. 
204 See id. at 1513. 
205504 u.s. 655 (1992). 
206 Noriega II, 117 F.3d at 1213. In Machain, the Court rejected the argument that an 
extradition treaty prohibited the United States from abducting a criminal defendant from 
Mexico. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 662. 
207 Separation of Powers, supra note 2, at 846. 
208 Id. at 852. 
209 See generally id. 
210 ld. 
211 Id. 
212 Separation of Powers, supra note 2, at 854. 
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the court failed to articulate any clear standard for determining ex-
ecutive intent in head of state cases, leaving great discretion for both 
federal courts and international tribunals.213 Thus, difficult problems 
may result in the future when courts continue to determine executive 
intent when that branch remains silent, imputing to the Executive 
Branch intent that it had not explicitly expressed.214 Yet, others con-
test that the court should interpret head of state immunity issues in 
the same manner as they adjudicate matters within the FSIA. 215 
VI. RAMIFICATIONS FOR SOVEREIGN LEADERS 
Judicial proceedings involving domestic courts and foreign for-
mer heads of state are not unique to the United States.216 In the years 
that followed the Noriega decision, similar issues of immunity and ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction were revisited in the context of judicial pro-
ceedings against former Chilean dictator Augosto Pinochet Ugarte, 
and are likely to resurface in future criminal proceedings against the 
former President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic.217 
A. The Case Against Augosto Pinochet 
Although not expressly stated, much of the reasoning applied by 
the Noriega Court was mirrored by English courts and the House of 
Lords in the Pinochet case.218 Similar to Noriega, the Pinochet case 
involved (1) whether Pinochet continued to enjoy immunity for acts 
committed during his tenure as head of state, and (2) whether cus-
tomary international law granted the English courts jurisdiction to 
extradite Pinochet to Spain.219 
Mter seventeen years as Chilean dictator, Pinochet stepped down 
on March 11, 1990, although he continued to command the military 
until March 10, 1998.22° Thereafter, the former dictator assumed the 
213 !d. 
214 Nanda, supra note 167, at 477. 
215 See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of Inter-
national Law, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2260,2270 (1998). 
216 See generally Jamison G. White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augosto Pinochet, Uni-
versal jurisdiction, the ICC and a Wake-Up Call for Former Heads of State, 50 CASE W. REs. L. 
REv.127, 144 (1999). 
217 Seeid. at 145. 
218 See generally Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE]. COMP. 
& INT'L. L. 415, 415-16 (2000). 
219White, supra note 216, at 145. 
22ll William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and 
the Move Towards a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 129, 
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title of Senator-for-Life and was granted immunity under the provi-
sions of the Chilean Constitution. 221 On July 1, 1996, a Spanish prose-
cutor filed a criminal complaint against Pinochet, alleging that he 
caused the detainment, torture, and execution of thousands of Chil-
ean citizens and citizens of other nations.222 In addition, it was alleged 
that following the violent overthrow of then Chilean president Salva-
dor Allende, Pinochet authorized the torture of thousands, including 
not only Chilean citizens, but also citizens of the United States and 
Spain, as part of an international conspiracy, named Operation Con-
dor, to track down and dispose of political opponents.223 The com-
plaint further asserted that Spanish courts could properly exercise 
jurisdiction over Pinochet under the universal principle, which al-
lowed prosecution by any state.224 
On October 16, 1998, a Spanish magistrate issued an arrest war-
rant after discovering that Pinochet was present in London recuperat-
ing from back surgery.225 The warrant specifically claimed that Pino-
chet had caused the murder of seventy-nine Spanish citizens in Chile 
in the period between 1973 and 1983.226 Following the issuance of a 
second warrant, Pinochet was arrested in London on October 16, 
1998.227 
In the Divisional Court, it was initially determined that Pinochet 
continued to enjoy immunity for acts committed while he was head of 
state.228 The issue of immunity was thereafter immediately certified to 
the House of Lords, where a decision to revoke recognition of immu-
nity was set aside after it was discovered that a link existed between a 
presiding Lord and a member of Amnesty International, an organiza-
tion that had intervened in opposition to Pinochet.229 However, on 
March 24, 1999, the House of Lords issued the final ruling of the tril-
ogy, holding that Pinochet was not entitled to enjoy immunity for his 
alleged crimes, since such allegations could not be considered official 
160-61 (2000). Pinochet Jed a military coup against the socialist government of Salvador 
Allende on September 11, 1973. Mter seizing power and declaring himself President, Pi-
nochet engaged in a brutal crackdown of opposition groups in an attempt to consolidate 
political power by torturing and killing both Chilean citizens and foreign nationals. !d. 
221 !d. 
222 !d. at 162. 
223 Byers, supra note 218, at 416--17, 422. 
224 See Aceves, supra note 220, at 162-63. 
225 !d. at 164. 
226 \\'bite, supra note 216, at 144-45. 
227 Byers, supra note 218, at 415. 
228 Aceves, supra note 220, at 165. 
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acts under international principles of immunity.230 Nevertheless, Pi-
nochet would once again escape extradition to face trial in Spain; he 
was released due to failing health and permitted to return to Chile.231 
Despite this escape, Pinochet was stripped of his immunity upon his 
return to Chile by the Chilean Supreme Court on August 8, 2000,232 
indicted, and placed on house arrest for his alleged crimes. 233 
In early 2001, the Chilean Supreme Court, which opined that 
investigators had failed to properly question Pinochet and subject him 
to psychological interviews, reversed this initial arrest order.234 How-
ever, Judge Juan Guzman quickly fulfilled those requirements in 
January, 2001, forcing Pinochet to undergo four days of psychological 
examination.235 Mter determining that Pinochet's medical condition 
was not sufficient to halt judicial proceedings and a personal interro-
gation of Pinochet, 236 Judge Guzman reinstated criminal charges 
against Pinochet stemming from the deaths and disappearances of 
some seventy-five political prisoners during a helibourne operation 
known as the "caravan of death."237 Once again, the reinstatement of 
charges, placement on house arrest, and Pinochet's plea of not guilty 
resulted in yet another appeal to the Santiago Court of Appeals, 
where defense lawyers asked the judges to release Pinochet from 
house arrest and to quash the charges. 238 This appeal again resulted 
in a setback for international proponents of sovereign accountabil-
ity.239 On March 8, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the homicide 
and kidnapping charges against Pinochet, leaving only the charges 
relating to Pinochet's alleged cover-up of such atrocities for possible 
230 !d. at 166-67. 
231 Ruth Wedgwood, 40th Anniversary Perspective: International Criminal Law and Augosto 
Pinochet, 40 VA.]. lNT'L. L. 829, 831 (2000). 
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bany, NY), Aug. 10, 2000, at A15. 
233 Isabel Hilton andJeevan Vasagar, Pinochet to Stand Trial: Ex President Arrested and In-
dicted for Alleged Crimes, THE GuARDIAN (London), Dec. 2, 2000, at 1. 
234 Clifford Krauss, Judge Reinstates Pinochet Case With New Order For House Arrest, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at A3. 
235 Marc Cooper, As Bush Heads South: Chile and the End of Pinochet, THE NATION, Feb. 
26, 2001, at 11. 
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trial.240 Furthermore, on March 13, 2001, a Chilean judge ruled that 
Pinochet could be released from house arrest by posting payment of 
two million pesos, equivalent to $3400.241 
Despite the initial willingness of the Chilean judicial system to 
attempt to bring Pinochet to justice, the reality is that such attempts 
have proven less effective than desired by international activists.242 
Many critics became disappointed with the progress of the case 
against Pinochet when it became apparent that he would face trial 
only for the lesser charges of covering-up the actions of the caravan of 
death.243 Rather than pursuing the most serious charges, critics al-
leged, the Chilean courts apparently sought to protect Pinochet in a 
manner inconsistent with international pressure.244 Human rights ac-
tivists became further outraged when, in July, 2001, a Chilean appeals 
court ruled that the former dictator was not well enough to stand 
trial, thereby reducing momentum in a case many believed was facing 
a slow procedural death. 245 
In comparison, unlike the Noriega case, where the federal courts 
exercised jurisdiction pursuant to the territorial and protective prin-
ciples, initial jurisdiction by the Spanish Courts was justified through 
an exercise of the universal and passive personality principles.246 
However, similar to Noriega, the House of Lords, accepting the posi-
tion asserted by the Spanish prosecutors, quickly disposed of the de-
fense arguments that Pinochet was immune from jurisdiction of for-
eign courts for acts committed while he was the head of state.247 
Although the ultimate outcome is unlikely to please many in the in-
ternational community, the case against Pinochet has set a powerful 
precedent likely to be used by other international tribunals seeking to 
prosecute foreign leaders for human rights violations and other viola-
tions of international and domestic law.248 
240 ld. 
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B. A Harbinger for Milosevic? 
In 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution establish-
ing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former YUgoslavia 
(Tribunal), responsible for the investigation and prosecution of war 
criminals in the former Yugoslavia occurring since January 1, 1991.249 
On May 27, 1999, the Tribunal indicted the former President of Yugo-
slavia, Slobodan Milosevic and four others, charging them with crimes 
against humanity and violations of international law. 250 To further the 
ends of justice, the Tribunal committed to denying head of state im-
munity claims.25I Specifically, Milosevic, removed from power in Oc-
tober, 2000,252 was charged with personal responsibility for ordering, 
planning, instigating, executing, and aiding and abetting the persecu-
tion, deportation, and murder of Kosovo Albanians from January, 
1999 to June, 1999.253 This campaign was allegedly undertaken with 
the objective of removing a substantial portion of the Kosovo Alba-
nian population from Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Ser-
bian dominance over the Province.254 
249 William Miller, Slobodan Milosevic's Prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia: A Harbinger of Things to Come for International Criminal justice, 22 LoY. 
L.A. INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 553, 554-55 (2000). 
250 Indictment, Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Milosevic et al., tt 90--100 (Int'l Crim. 
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chive for the Milosevic et al. Case (Jan. 26, 2001), available at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/ 
news/Milosevic/ milosevic-cd.htm. 
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In the winter of 2001, the case against Milosevic followed a path 
very similar to the Chilean case against Pinochet.255 Despite work on a 
new Yugoslav law that would remove the ban on the extradition of 
Yugoslav citizens, thus allowing extradition of Milosevic to the Tribu-
nal, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica publicly suggested that he 
remained opposed to Milosevic's extradition.256 Apparently less coop-
erative with the Tribunal than desired,257 Kostunica maintained in 
February, 2001 that the first priority was to try Milosevic at home,258 
rather than risk angering nationalists by extraditing Milosevic to the 
Tribunal. 259 
Despite the reluctance to extradite Milosevic, Yugoslav leaders 
began purging the legal system of Milosevic loyalists in early 2001.260 
The most notable arrest was that of Rade Markovic, the former secret 
police chief under the Milosevic regime.261 With this arrest, prosecu-
tors hoped that information gained from Markovic would lead to the 
arrest of Milosevic himself. 262 
Although the Yugoslav government made positive efforts to 
commence criminal actions against Milosevic and his inner circle, the 
Tribunal publicly opposed Kostunica, emphasizing the importance of 
extraditing Milosevic rather than trying him at home.263 The Prosecu-
tor, Carla del Ponte, insisted that Milosevic was no different from any 
other person indicted by the Tribunal, and that Yugoslavia was obli-
gated by international law to transfer the former leader to the 
Hague.264 The Tribunal was primarily concerned that any trial in 
255 See Misha Savic, Milosevic Soon to Face his Interrogators, THE GuARDIAN (London), 
Feb.26,2001,at13. 
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258 Kratovac, supra note 256. 
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Yugoslavia would neglect the more serious alleged war crimes and fo-
cus on domestic charges, such as embezzlement, corruption, and po-
litical assassination.265 The United States reiterated these concerns 
that the Yugoslav judicial system was not pursuing Milosevic vigor-
ously.266 Under a measure adopted by the U.S. Congress in 2000, 
Yugoslavia was required to demonstrate that it was cooperating with 
the U.N. Tribunal by March 31, 2001, or risk loosing $100 million in 
U.S. aid and consideration for the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank.267 Nevertheless, Belgrade officials insisted that Milosevic 
face trial at home prior to any extradition. 268 Critics asserted that this 
insistence was the result of Kostunica's fear of being labeled a puppet 
of the west.269 
On April 1, 2001, just prior to the U.S. deadline for revoking 
financial aid, fugoslav special police officers conducted a raid to seize 
Milosevic from his home.27o Mter an exchange of gunfire and lengthy 
negotiations, Milosevic surrendered to police.271 Following the arrest, 
Yugoslav officials reiterated their intent to try Milosevic in Belgrade 
on various charges relating to abuse of power and corruption.272 In-
ternational pressure continued to grow, however, and Kostunica was 
pressured to transfer Milosevic to the Tribunal to face war crime 
charges. 273 
Accepting the necessity to cooperate and the lesser of two evils, 
the fugoslav cabinet adopted a decree to transfer Milosevic to the 
Tribunal in June, 2001.274 Ultimately, Milosevic was transferred to the 
Hague on June 29, 2001, following an unsuccessful attempt to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the extradition decree in Yugoslav 
courts.275 At his initial appearance before the Tribunal onJuly 3, 2001, 
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266 See Alan Sipress, Yugolsavia Vows Arrest of Milosevic, lNT'L HERALD TruB., Mar. 8, 
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Milosevic refused to enter a plea, and contested "I consider this tribu-
nal [a] false tribunal and [the] indictments false indictments. It is il-
legal .... "276 
On November 8, 2001, The Trial Chamber of the Tribunal de-
cided an initial motion to dismiss brought by Milosevic and amici cu-
riae.277 In the motion, Milosevic and amici curiae argued: (1) the Tri-
bunal was an illegal entity because the U.N. Security Council lacked 
the power to establish it; (2) the prosecutor had not maintained 
prosecutorial independence, and was therefore in violation of the 
Tribunal's Statute, Article 16, paragraph 2; (3) the Tribunal was 
impermissibly tainted with bias against Milosevic; ( 4) The Tribunal 
lacked competence to prosecute Milosevic due to his status as the 
former President of Yugoslavia; (5) the Tribunal lacked competence 
to prosecute Milosevic due to his unlawful surrender and extradition 
to the Hague; and (6) the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.278 The Trial 
Chamber rejected each of these arguments, relying on Article 7, 
paragraph 2 of the Tribunal's Statute.279 Specifically, the Tribunal re-
jected Milosevic's claims of immunity due to his status as the former 
President of YUgoslavia, stating that Article 7, which rejected head of 
state immunity, reflected an accepted principle of customary interna-
tional law. 280 Additionally, the Trial Chamber relied on the Pinochet 
case and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 281 
Similar to the developments in the Pinochet case, the Yugoslav 
judicial system was initially criticized as being reluctant to pursue the 
more serious charges of war crimes against Milosevic, favoring any 
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possible trial on lesser charges similar to tax evasion.282 The indict-
ment against Milosevic is similar to the cases against Noriega and Pi-
nochet in that all were former leaders of sovereign nations, thus im-
plicating issues of immunity and jurisdiction.283 As the indictment 
makes allegations of war crimes, the Tribunal is likely to make an ar-
gument justifying jurisdiction under the universal principle.284 It is 
apparent that the coming Milosevic trial represents the most 
significant test for the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.285 Since 
Milosevic has repeatedly refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, the arguments of the Noriega case, which were dismissed by 
the Trial Chamber, are likely to arise once again, and the Tribunal 
would be wise to follow the reasoning there set forth.286 As with the 
Noriega and Pinochet cases, the Tribunal and the Appeals Chamber 
should deny immunity to Milosevic.287 
C. The Future & Ramifications for Sovereign Leaders 
The Noriega and Pinochet cases, along with the indictment levied 
against Milosevic, have limited dramatically the immunity that former 
heads of state can claim for criminal activity, and also illustrate the 
international community's willingness to maintain jurisdiction over 
criminal acts conducted abroad by such state officials.288 Although 
the underlying crimes may be fundamentally different, with Noriega 
convicted of drug related crimes, Pinochet indicted for crimes of tor-
ture and human rights violations, and Milosevic indicted for war 
crimes,289 the indictments and willingness to prosecute former heads 
of state will likely deter future war crimes, human rights violations, 
drug trafficking, and other violations of international law, by estab-
lishing that those who transgress the norms of customary interna-
tional law shall be held accountable.290 
The case against Noriega and the indictments of Pinochet and 
Milosevic have affirmed that principles of international criminal ac-
282 See generally Tightening the Net,]APAN TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001. 
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countability apply to heads of state, and furthermore, former heads of 
state will not be able to hide behind a shield of jurisdictional and im-
munity challenges.291 As a commitment to these ideals, in July, 1998, 
120 states adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court with jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against human-
ity.292 Although it is questionable whether Noriega's crimes would fall 
within the jurisdiction of the court, the statute expressly provides that 
heads of state will not have immunity with respect to crimes under 
internationallaw.293 However, even though an international criminal 
system promoting universal jurisdiction over crimes would be highly 
effective in protecting human rights and promoting accountability of 
heads of state,294 most domestic courts are still reluctant to apply uni-
versal and other forms of extraterritorialjurisdiction.295 
Although the preceding cases, which have begun to use national 
courts in a new international sense,296 have affirmed the fundamental 
principle of individual accountability for violations of international 
law,297 proceduralists argue that a system of international law without 
clear parameters restraining the exercise of jurisdiction and tolerating 
the dishonoring of immunity is akin to no system of justice at all.298 
Many argue that exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the re-
moval of immunity will lead to an unstable system of international 
politics.299 Such a system of justice may create more problems than it 
solves. 300 Is the justice reached in the preceding cases the type that 
can only be exacted by the victor on the vanquished-the will of the 
291 See Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo: A 
"Good" or "Bad" War?93 AM.J. INT'L. L. 841,846 (1999). 
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tional scholars and jurists, convinced that more public international figures could face trial 
for their crimes in the future, proposed the Princeton Principles on Universal jurisdiction. 
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strong imposed on the weak?301 What limits should be placed on na-
tional sovereignty?302 If current trends continue, proceduralists argue, 
what is to protect current and former heads of states in nations such 
as Israel, Mexico, and the United States?3°3 Furthermore, what is to 
prevent countries, such as Iraq and Libya, from issuing warrants for 
the leaders of the United States?304 The question that remains is 
whether a nation has the authority under international law to judge 
the policies of other sovereign nations.305 What may be at stake, critics 
argue, is the validity of national sovereignty.306 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Noriega case provided controversial issues of first 
impression, the court's reasoning is consistent with customary inter-
national law. The court rationally justified its exercise of jurisdiction 
over Noriega through both the territorial and protective principles of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The evidence adduced at trial established 
that Noriega had purchased a Lear jet and had used it on numerous 
occasions to fly cocaine into and drug proceeds out of the territory of 
the United States, thus warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under 
the territorial principle. Moreover, the evidence established that given 
the serious drug epidemic presently existing in the United States, the 
introduction of mass quantities of narcotics into the country surely 
would result in unwelcome harmful effects, thereby justifying the pro-
tective exercise of jurisdiction. 
As for the issue of immunity, the court similarly applied rational, 
widely supported principles of international law. Thus, the court ap-
propriately found that Noriega, who was not recognized as the right-
ful leader of Panama, should not be afforded immunity under the 
doctrine of head of state immunity. Likewise, the court rightfully de-
nied immunity under the act of state doctrine since his illegal acts 
were positively undertaken for his own profit, and not for the benefit 
of Panama. 
Although critics conceivably could protest that the court should 
have considered Noriega's status as the de facto head of state and for-
mer confident of the CIA in weighing whether the exercise of jurisdic-
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tion was reasonable, the court was logical and correct in maintaining 
that the issues of immunity and extraterritorial jurisdiction should be 
considered separately. Undoubtedly, this approach and the subse-
quent Noriega decision provide a warning to future sovereign leaders 
of foreign nations and guidance to future tribunals called upon to try 
a foreign head of state for extraterritorial crimes. The practical results 
of this landmark decision very well may be to increase the account-
ability of world leaders by the international community, an issue that 
the English courts have already addressed in the Pinochet indictment, 
and that foreign international tribunals are sure to examine in the 
forthcoming prosecutions of Milosevic for universally condemned 
crimes. 
Even if the results of similar suits against former sovereign lead-
ers do not reach the arguable success of the Noriega prosecution, in-
ternational pressure to hold leaders accountable can result in domes-
tic charges that are somewhat similar to those existing under 
international and foreign tribunals, as in the Pinochet and Milosevic 
cases. Due to the actions in the cases surrounding Noriega, Milosevic, 
and Pinochet, domestic courts across the globe, whether in Chile, Mi-
ami, Yugoslavia, or Spain, are growing more inclined to dismember 
any shield of immunity and hold former leaders accountable for their 
actions under domestic and international law. However, despite these 
optimistic actions by domestic courts, the effects are far from optimal. 
Recent developments in the Pinochet and Milosevic cases have illus-
trated that domestic courts, while willing to heed international pres-
sures to bring former sovereigns to justice, are unwilling to pursue the 
most serious of alleged crimes of which the former dictators are sus-
pected by the international community. In both cases, present leaders 
appeared hesitant to yield entirely to international demands, fearful 
of aggravating nationalists. For example, while Pinochet is alleged to 
have ordered the murder and kidnapping of numerous left wing op-
ponents, the Chilean judicial system now does not seem poised to 
bring him to trial. Similarly, Yugoslavia was initially reluctant to trans-
fer Milosevic to the Hague. 
While some action is preferable to inaction, international activists 
would prefer judicial action to lie somewhere in the middle ground 
among the present state of events and the drastic remedies pursued 
by the United States in the Noriega case. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that there is a growing trend towards 
accountability of former sovereign leaders for their illegal acts while 
in office. The only question that remains is where the line should be 
drawn. How does a tribunal balance the interests of international 
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criminal accountability and the need for reciprocity? Why do states 
prosecute leaders such as Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic, while 
others do not pursue sovereigns such as Gaddafi, Mugabe, or Bush? 
Future tribunals of justice will continue to ask these questions as the 
desirability of political accountability grows. Those tribunals have the 
difficult task of determining when the interests of justice are sufficient 
to ignore the policy reasons inherent in the concepts of immunity and 
jurisdiction. 
